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In this article, I will offer an argument for the protection of
intellectual property based on individual self-interest and
prudence. In large part, this argument will parallel considerations
that arise in a prisoner’s dilemma game. In brief, allowing content
to be unprotected in terms of free access leads to a sub-optimal
outcome where creation and innovation are suppressed. Adopting
the institutions of copyright, patent, and trade secret is one way to
avoid these sub-optimal results.
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INTRODUCTION
A major concern and limitation on traditional justifications for
intellectual property is that few scholars accept the starting
assumptions needed to generate the desired moral claims. For
example, utilitarian incentives-based arguments for intellectual
property have been rejected for both external and internal reasons.
These arguments center on promoting social utility by
incentivizing authors and inventors to innovate in exchange for
limited rights. Externally, as a moral theory, utilitarianism has
come under attack for failing to account for special obligations,
claims of distributive and retributive justice, and undermining
individual integrity or life-long project pursuit.1 Internally, even
assuming that utilitarianism is the correct moral theory, it is not at
all clear whether individual ownership of intellectual works can be
justified, or more generally, whether the institutions of copyright,
patent, and trade secret, are warranted.2 More specifically, it would
be difficult to justify twenty-year patent monopolies or lifetimeplus-seventy-year copyrights on utilitarian grounds.3
Starting with Lockean labor-mixing accounts, or other
foundational assumptions, seems to fare no better. According to
Locke, by mixing labor with an unowned object, individuals could
come to own the item in question.4 David Hume argued that the
idea of mixing one’s labor is incoherent—actions cannot be mixed
with objects.5 Robert Nozick asked, why isn’t mixing what I own
1

See generally SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (rev. ed.
1994); CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988); Bernard
Williams & J.J.C. Smart, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
2
See Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31–
52 (1989); ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION CONTROL:
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 37–71 (New York: Routledge
Pub. 2004) (2001); Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social
Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 602–30
(2003) [hereinafter Moore, Incentive Based Arguments]; HUGH BREAKEY, INTELLECTUAL
LIBERTY: NATURAL RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38–58 (New York: Routledge
Pub. 2012).
3
17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988), 35 U.S.C.§ 154(a)(2) (1994).
4
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, § 27 (C.B. MacPherson ed.,
Hackett Pub.1980) (1690).
5
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 3, pt. 2, § 3 (L.A. Selby-Bigge
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1896) (1739); see also, Jeremy Waldron, Two Worries about
Mixing One’s Labor, 33 PHIL. Q. 37, 40, 41 (Oxford Univ. Press 1983).
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(my labor) a way of losing my labor rather than obtaining a
property right?6 P.J. Proudhon questioned why, if labor is
important, shouldn’t the second laborer on an object obtain a
property right in an object as reliably as the first laborer?7 Jeremy
Waldron and others have argued that mixing one’s labor with an
unowned object should yield more limited rights than rights of full
ownership.8 These challenges have not gone unnoticed among
defenders of Lockean-based arguments for private property.9 In
each case, however, internal and external objections are offered,
leaving the justification for intellectual property compelling only to
those who find the initial assumptions plausible.
In this Article, and setting aside various foundational moral
entanglements, I offer an argument for the protection of intellectual
property based on individual self-interest and prudence. While
consequences play a fundamental role, the argument and analysis
discussed below are not utilitarian in nature. There is no
maximization of net or average utility required. In large part, this
argument parallels considerations that arise in a prisoner’s
dilemma game. In Part I, a sketch of the salient features of
prisoner’s dilemma games is provided. Examining the nature of
intellectual property and how content creation, exclusion, and
access can be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma is the focus of Part
II. In Part III, empirical evidence is offered and analyzed. In brief,
allowing content to be unprotected in terms of free access will lead
to a sub-optimal outcome where creation and innovation are
6

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–75 (Basic Books 1974).
P.J. Proudhon, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 61 (Howard Fertig 1966) (1867); see also John
Plamenatz, MAN AND SOCIETY 247 (McGraw-Hill 1963).
8
Waldron, supra note 5, at 42; Geraint Parry, JOHN LOCKE 52 (1978).
9
See generally A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (Princeton Univ.
Press 1994) (1992). See also, Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor
Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 283 (2012);
Moore, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION, supra note 2; Adam D. Moore, A
Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property Revisited, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1069 (2012)
[hereinafter Moore, Lockean Theory Revisited]; Adam D. Moore, Intangible Property:
Privacy, Power, and Information Control, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 365 (1998); Adam D. Moore,
A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (1997) [hereinafter
Moore, Lockean Theory]; Kenneth Einar Himma, Justifying Intellectual Property
Protection: Why the Interests of Content-Creators Usually Wins Over Everyone Else’s, in
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 47 (Emma Rooksby & John Weckert
eds., 2006).
7
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suppressed. Finally, in Part IV, it is argued that adopting the
institutions of copyright, patent, and trade secret is one way we can
avoid the sub-optimal results of playing an intellectual property
prisoner’s dilemma.
I. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA10
The classic version of a prisoner’s dilemma game begins with
two individuals and two choices.11 Fred and Ginger are picked up
by the police and charged with robbing a bank. Each are given the
choice of informing (ratting) on the other or staying silent. If Fred
rats on Ginger and she remains silent, he is set free and she will be
sentenced to life in prison. If Ginger rats on Fred while he remains
silent, then she is set free while he is sentenced to life in prison. If
both rat on each other, then both are sentenced to twenty years in
jail. Finally, if both stay silent, then each will be sentenced to one
year in jail.
Figure 1:

10

See Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 306 (1981) [hereinafter Axelrod, Emergence of Cooperation]; ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (Basic Books 1984) [hereinafter Axelrod,
EVOLUTION]; BRIAN SKYRMS, THE DYNAMICS OF RATIONAL DELIBERATION (Harvard
Univ. Press 1990).
11
See Merrill M. Flood, Some Experimental Games, 5 MGMT. SCI. 5 (1958). The story
is credited to Albert Tucker. See Sylvia Nasar, Albert W. Tucker, 89, Pioneering
Mathematician, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at A20, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/27
/obituaries/albert-w-tucker-89-pioneering-mathematician.html
[https://perma.cc/JL2A5NQ6].
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Both Fred and Ginger prefer freedom to one year, one year to
twenty years, and twenty years to life in prison. Given the
structure, payoffs, and preferences, the option of “ratting”
dominates over the option of “staying silent.” That is, no matter
what the other player does, it is always better to rat. Ginger would
reason the following way: “Suppose Fred rats, then I will do better
to rat as well and avoid the sentence of life in prison. Suppose Fred
stays silent, then I will do better if I rat and attain freedom. Either
way, ratting is better.” Of course, Fred is engaging in the same sort
of reasoning and thus both are driven to a sub-optimal outcome.
Both will rat. The lesson of such a game is that prudentially
rational, self-interested players will end up with sub-optimal
outcomes.12 Collectively, however, both would do better if each
remained silent. If Fred and Ginger could just cooperate, then they
could each avoid the harsh result of spending twenty years in
prison. This option yields what economists call “Pareto
optimality”13—what is individually rational may well be
collectively irrational.
A. Iterated and Multi-Player Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Prisoner’s dilemma games can also be played between two
players numerous times. Imagine that Fred and Ginger were going
to play an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with no known end
point.14 They might play ten rounds or one hundred rounds of the
game. In this sort of game, when both can reasonably guess that
the game will continue for some time, strategies like tit-for-tat
dominate.15 A tit-for-tat strategy starts off with cooperation (non12

Thus, ratting is said to dominate staying silent and is a “Nash equilibrium.” “A Nash
equilibrium is any profile of strategies—one for each player—in which each player’s
strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other players.” Ken Binmore, Why all the
Fuss? The Many Aspects of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA:
CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 16, 20 (Martin Peterson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2015).
13
Pareto conditions are named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian economist
and sociologist. See Vilfredo Pareto, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/biography/Vilfredo-Pareto [https://perma.cc/A6VF-BNQ2] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
14
See Axelrod, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 10.
15
See Axelrod, Emergence of Cooperation, supra note 10, at 311. For indefinitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma games tit-for-tat is a Nash equilibrium.
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ratting) and then imitates the opponent’s previous move in
subsequent rounds.16 The problem is that if either player guesses
the game is nearing its end, defection or ratting becomes the
dominant strategy once again.17 Defection, or threat of defection,
pressures players to not cooperate as the game progresses.18
Rather than a two-person game, consider a multi-player game
with an unknown number of counterparts. In this version of the
game, if only one person rats, then that person is set free while the
others all get life in prison. If more than one player rats, then those
that rat get twenty years while those that remain silent get life in
prison. Finally, if everyone remains silent, then each player is
sentenced to one year in prison. As with the single-player version
of the prisoner’s dilemma game, the option of ratting dominates
over staying silent. Again, what is individually rational yields a
collectively sub-optimal outcome.
The tragedy of the commons can also be modeled as a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma game.19 Garret Hardin writes,
If a pasture becomes a commons open to all, the
right of each to use it may not be matched by a
corresponding responsibility to protect it. Asking
16

Id.; see also Axelrod, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 13.
Axelrod, Emergence of Cooperation, supra note 10, at 307, 312.
18
Pettit and Sugden offer a critique of this argument. See Phillip Pettit & Robert
Sugden, The Backward Induction Paradox, 86 J. PHIL. 169 (1989). While this backward
induction argument has been challenged in two-person iterated prisoner’s dilemmas with
no known end point, it is not at all clear that such considerations hold in multi-player
iterated prisoner’s dilemmas.
19
See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243–48 (1968);
see also, R. M. Dawes, Formal Models of Dilemmas in Social Decision Making, in
HUMAN JUDGEMENT AND DECISION PROCESSES 87, (M. F. Kaplan & S. Schwartz, eds.,
Academic Press, 1975); Xin Yao & Paul J. Darwen, An Experimental Study of N-Person
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games, 18 INFORMATICA 435 (1994) (James E. Alt &
Douglass C. North eds., 1st ed. 1990); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990).
Others have modeled public goods problems, like the tragedy of the commons, as
assurance, chicken, or voting games. See Luc Bovens, The Tragedy of the Commons as a
Voting Game, in THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 156
(Martin Peterson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015); Geoffrey Brennan & Michael
Brooks, The Role of Numbers in Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Public Good Situations, in
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 177 (Martin Peterson
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
17
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everyone to use it with discretion will hardly do, for
the
considerate
herdsman
who
refrains
from overloading the commons suffers more
than a selfish one who says his needs are
greater. If everyone would restrain himself,
all would be well; but it takes only one less
than everyone to ruin a system of voluntary
restraint. In a crowded world of less than perfect
human beings, mutual ruin is inevitable if there are
no controls. This is the tragedy of the commons.20
In this sort of example, value will be destroyed if it is overused.
Adding in one or two extra sheep will benefit me at only a slight
cost to others who use the commons. The result of each herder
thinking this way is overgrazing, and the destruction of the
commons. Admittedly, some overgrazing is within the carrying
capacity of the typical commons. Nevertheless, there will be some
amount of overuse that cannot be sustained. Once this point is
reached, overgrazing will ensure the destruction of this common
resource. As with the two-person version of a prisoner’s dilemma
game, there appears to be a dominant action. Each player would do
better by overusing the commons no matter what the other players
do.21 Individuals acting prudentially lead to a collective tragedy.
B. Solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Solutions to prisoner’s dilemma-style games are varied.22 One
possibility would be to change the payoffs in the game. For
example, imagine that a government, or Hobbes’ Leviathan,23
20

Garret Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor, PSYCHOL.
TODAY, Sept. 1974, at 800.
21
For a rich discussion of these issues, see MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF
COOPERATION (1987); Phillip Pettit, Free Riding and Foul Dealing, 83 J. PHIL.
361 (1986).
22
For recent experiments exploring different ways to solve the prisoner’s dilemma, see
Charles Holt, Cathleen Johnson, & David Schmidtz, Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments, in
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 243 (Martin Peterson,
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
23
Thomas Hobbes’ solution to a version of the prisoner’s dilemma was to institute a
powerful government, a Leviathan, to incentivize individuals to cooperate. THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76–103 (Rod Hay ed., McMaster Univ. 1999) (1651)
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would penalize individuals who acted out of prudence or narrow
self-interest. In the two-person version of this scenario, a payoff of
freedom would come with some sanction like severe weekly
beatings. In this case, prudence and self-interest would lead toward
silence and a collectively optimal solution. In multi-player games,
like Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, the Leviathan could simply
penalize those who overuse shared resources. Hardin’s own
solution to the tragedy of the commons was to assign property
rights along with corresponding legal obligations and privileges.24
By setting up institutions of private property, the negative
consequences of overuse can be internalized by those who own the
land.25
Another solution to the tragedy of the commons or the
prisoner’s dilemma game is to only play with individuals that you
trust. By being a transparent and public cooperator, a player can
choose accordingly, and thus avoid sub-optimal outcomes.26
Imagine a close-knit community where ratting on each other, or
being non-cooperative, would be known to everyone. Those who
made decisions based on narrow self-interest would find
themselves at a disadvantage or ostracized altogether.
The Silk-Road escrow and reputation system was a real-life
example of how to solve a prisoner’s dilemma.27 The Silk-Road
was an anonymous online drug buying and selling black market.28

https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobbes/Leviathan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CTG3-ATFA].
24
Hardin, supra note 19, at 1245.
25
Id. at 1247.
26
See DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); David Gautheir, How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in THE PRISONER’S
DILEMMA: CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 35 (Martin Peterson ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2015); see also Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden, Theories of Team Agency, in
MICHAEL BACHARACH, BEYOND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE: TEAMS AND FRAMES IN GAME
THEORY 280 (Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden eds., Princeton Univ. Press 2006).
27
The original Silk Road was seized by the FBI in 2013 only to rise again in different
iterations. New decentralized markets and cryptocurrencies are being developed with
presumably new technological ways to solve the prisoner’s dilemma problem. For a
history of the Silk Road and its founder, Ross Ulbricht, see Joshuah Bearman, The Rise &
Fall of Silk Road, WIRED (May 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/
[https://perma.cc/638C-LCWL].
28
See id.
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Using Bitcoin as the currency and the Tor onion browser29 to
access the site, buyers and sellers connect to complete transactions.
If a mechanism to ensure cooperation did not exist, the problems
are obvious. If a seller could collect money first and then send the
drugs, there would be no reason to actually send the product.
Sellers could just keep the money and the drugs. Conversely, if the
drugs were sent first, buyers would have no reason to send
payment. Moreover, both buyers and sellers could reenter the
market using different account names, so that the history of their
prior uncooperative acts would be unknown. The optimal outcome
would be for a party to receive the item (money or drugs) without
completing the transaction. The next best outcome would be for a
complete transaction: the seller receives the money and the buyer
receives the drugs. The sub-optimal outcome would be no
exchanges for either party. Finally, for the seller, the worst
outcome would be to have sent the drugs and not received
payment. The worst outcome for the buyer would be to have sent
the money and not received the drugs.
The Silk-Road, and many of its imitators, solved this problem
by having the buyer place the purchase money in an escrow
account, which could only be released to the seller once the drugs
arrived as advertised.30 In this case, the system administrator, the
Dread Pirate Roberts, would collect a small fee from the money in
the escrow account and send the Bitcoins on to the seller.31
Additionally, reputation also played a role in this system. Sellers
and buyers could leave feedback about the product or payment.32

29

“Tor stands for ‘the Onion Router’ and was launched by the Navy in 2002.” See id.
See id.
31
The Dread Pirate Roberts was the fictional name of the Silk Road’s administrator
Ross Ulbricht. The Silk Road’s escrow account was a bitcoin holding account controlled
by Ulbricht. See id.
32
Andy Greenberg, Meet the Dread Pirate Roberts, the Man Behind Booming Black
Market Drug Website Silk Road, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013, 11:31 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/14/meet-the-dread-pirate-robertsthe-man-behind-booming-black-market-drug-website-silk-road/#500b0bf88b73
[https://perma.cc/47FH-RFUK].
30
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Both parties could attain a reputation of fair dealing with other
buyers and sellers.33
One of the problems associated with the Silk Road and its
progeny is that there is nothing that keeps the escrow
administrators honest. The best administrators develop a reputation
of fair dealing and always paying off sellers upon notification of
product arrival and quality. But, as these sites grow, there might be
millions of dollars’ worth of Bitcoins held in escrow accounts, and
there is nothing buyers or sellers can do if the administrators
simply abscond with the entire escrow account. This is called an
“exit scam.”34 Modeled as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, this
would amount to one of the parties being able to unilaterally end
the game after securing optimal results. In this version, the two
players are the administrator and the buyer/seller, the latter being
thought of as one combined player. The current solution for exit
scamming by administrators is for buyers and sellers to only work
in small exchanges or markets and to risk only a small percentage
of their bankroll or product at one time.35 Moreover, there is also
the possibility of automating the administrator’s function. If the
game has no end and the administrator fees cannot be changed,
then perhaps a collectively optimal equilibrium will emerge. In any
case, as discussed below, the use of reputation and escrow
accounts will not provide a solution for a prisoner’s dilemma
involving intellectual property content, creation, and copying.36
II. CONTENT CREATION AND COPYING MODELED AS A PRISONER’S
DILEMMA
Imagine that we have two intellectual property creators, Crusoe
and Friday, and two possible outcomes for each. In a single-play
33

Andy Greenberg, The Dark Web Drug Lords Who Got Away, WIRED (June 2, 2015,
10:42 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/06/dark-web-drug-lords-got-away/ [https://
perma.cc/V6H5-YUHW].
34
Andy Greenberg, The Silk Road’s Dark-Web Dream is Dead, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2016,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/the-silk-roads-dark-web-dream-is-dead/
[https://perma.cc/KZG7-QPFX].
35
This is exactly the strategy noticed by Charles Holt, Cathleen Johnson, and David
Schmidtz. See Holt et al., supra note 22, at 251–52.
36
See infra Part II.
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prisoner’s dilemma game, each player can copy an intellectual
creation of the other, or not. Assume as well that the intellectual
works created by Crusoe and Friday are valuable, interesting, or
desired. The best case for either player is that their own intellectual
creation is not copied, and yet they get to copy the work of the
other player. This is ‘best’ for the player who copies and ‘worst’
for the player who does not because (1) the player who copies
enjoys or consumes more content compared to the other player; (2)
the player who copies still has the option or possibility of obtaining
a benefit by selling, trading, or bartering with the other player,
while the non-copier does not enjoy these possibilities—which
provides a way to recoup research and development costs; and (3)
via selling, trading, or bartering, the copier may obtain a positional
advantage and more capital for future exchanges compared to the
non-copier. Simply put, the copier obtains more content and retains
more opportunities to sell, barter, or exchange than the noncopier.37
If Friday and Crusoe both refrain from copying each other,
then each will avoid the worst outcome in terms of recouping
investment costs and being at a positional disadvantage. Both will
also retain the option of buying or bartering for the non-copied
content, which the other enjoys. This payoff is ‘okay,’ better than
‘worst,’ but not as good as ‘best.’ If both Friday and Crusoe copy
each other, then both will get extra content to enjoy and will not be
put at a positional disadvantage, but each will be denied the
possibility of recouping research and development costs. Alas, the
other player will not buy or barter for content he or she already
possesses.

37
Law Professor Sean O’Connor reminds us that ‘real life’ cases may actually be
worse. O’Connor writes: “Some innovators are economically benefitting from their own
IP-protected services by monetizing these services through a model that undermines
creators’ IP. In other words, when Google, for example, uses its advanced algorithms to
profit from advertising and data mining tied to links to pirate sites or copyright-infringing
content on its subsidiary, YouTube, it is very much relying on its patents, trade secret,
copyright, and contract protections on these algorithms so that other search and social
media firms cannot simply duplicate this code.” Sean M. O’Connor, Creators,
Innovators, and Appropriation Mechanisms, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 973, 995 (2015).
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Figure 2:

Assuming that Crusoe and Friday both prefer ‘best’ to ‘okay,’
‘okay’ to ‘bad,’ and ‘bad’ to ‘worst,’ this scenario produces the
structure of a single-play prisoner’s dilemma, where copying
dominates. Given that it is plausible to assume that content
creation depends on time, effort, industry, capacity creation, and
other investments, it is not implausible to model Crusoe and
Friday’s preferences this way.
Crusoe would reason the following way: “Suppose Friday
copies, then I will do better to copy as well. I will not be able to
trade my intellectual work with Friday in the future because he
already has a copy, and thus I will have fewer opportunities to
recoup research and development costs. Moreover, I will have less
content to enjoy, and if this content would provide greater health
and well-being, I may suffer a positional disadvantage as Friday
amasses more capital. Supposing that Friday does not copy, then I
will do better by copying for reasons already mentioned. Either
way, copying is better.” Of course, Friday is engaging in the same
sort of reasoning and thus both are driven to copy. Finally,
knowing this ahead of time, those who would engage in content
creation may well deploy their efforts in other ways to avoid these
risks. If this analysis is plausible, it is not far-fetched to assert that,
without protections against copying, there would be a natural
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suppression of intellectual property creation. Neither Crusoe nor
Friday would find it prudent to engage in such creative activities.38
Consider a slightly different case. Imagine that Crusoe is a
content creator and Friday is a mere content consumer. This cannot
be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma, because Crusoe has no choice
to copy or not to copy; however, it does illustrate the futility of
Crusoe’s position if he chooses to create content. In the short run,
Friday has everything to gain and nothing to lose by copying the
intellectual works of Crusoe. Thus, Crusoe has nothing to gain by
engaging in the necessary research and development needed to
create intellectual works. All of this becomes more salient when
we move to iterated prisoner’s dilemma games with numerous
players. Crusoe is not just playing with Friday, but rather he is
playing with thousands, perhaps millions, of other content creators
and consumers. Moreover, if we allow for the possibility of both
copying and downstream economic exploitation of copied
intellectual works, the suppression of content creation seems to be
guaranteed. If so, a sub-optimal result follows.
Consider the following illustration. Suppose that after months
of effort and numerous failed experiments, Bonnie creates a new
recipe for spicy noodles. Clyde, on the other hand, has spent years
creating a new widget-making machine. Both of these creations
are, let us suppose, useful and greatly desired by others living and
working nearby. Both Bonnie and Clyde can expect to recoup their
investment costs, and perhaps earn a living, by selling or licensing
noodles or widgets. Bonnie and Clyde enter a prisoner’s dilemma
game when both are given the opportunity to copy and exploit the
intellectual efforts of the other. While walking by Clyde’s house,
Bonnie could peek in the window and take a quick picture of
Clyde’s widget-making machine designs, build the same widgetmaking machine, and quickly start producing widgets. At the same
38

Sean O’Connor notes that quality requires sustained immersion in a practice.
Moreover, such immersion requires an ‘appropriation mechanism’ to protect income and
to recoup costs. O’Conner writes, “There is, however, a direct and pragmatic argument
for the value of a full-time creative class: maintaining and being at the top of one’s craft
requires daily practice . . . . The importance of daily engagement in one’s craft is well
represented by performing artists such as musicians, who refer to the phenomenon as
‘chops.’ To ‘keep his chops up,’ the musician must constantly practice.” Id. at 990.
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time, Clyde could peek in Bonnie’s window, take a picture of her
recipe, and then start selling the noodles.
Note that nothing important turns on the fact that Bonnie and
Clyde are selling artifacts rather than the ideas that make up the
recipe or machine design. For example, Clyde could sell Bonnie’s
recipe, the set of ideas, to local chefs for a fee. Alternatively,
Bonnie could sell Clyde’s widget-making machine designs to local
merchants. In either case, because neither has incurred research or
development costs, both would be able to market the set of ideas at
a lower price point than the other.
The best case for Bonnie and the worst for Clyde would be if
Bonnie copies and Clyde does not. Without the investment costs,
Bonnie would likely be able to sell widgets at a lower price than
Clyde, thus easily capturing a dominant market share. This is the
worst case for Clyde because he would likely lose all of his startup investment costs and ongoing market share. Moreover, by not
copying and exploiting Bonnie’s recipe, Clyde would be at a
competitive and positional disadvantage. Bonnie would be able to
gather more profits and deploy this capital to her advantage. In the
case where neither player copies or exploits the intellectual
creations of the other, both could expect to do ‘okay’—not as good
as ‘best,’ but better than ‘worst.’ If both do not copy, both could
expect to recoup investment costs and perhaps make a profit.
Moreover, neither would attain a competitive and positional
advantage.
Finally, if both creators copy and exploit the efforts of the
other, then neither could expect to recoup the investment costs of
their own original invention. Whatever costs Bonnie has incurred
in creating the recipe, Clyde has avoided. Thus, Clyde would be
able to sell the noodles at a lower price point than Bonnie. This
would also be true of Bonnie if she sells widgets. Additionally, for
Bonnie, assuming that each product has approximately equal
investment costs, in cases where both parties copy and exploit the
intellectual efforts of the other, she would do better to sell widgets.
Clyde, in similar conditions, would do better to sell noodles. By
copying and exploiting the efforts of the other, both Bonnie and
Clyde might recoup the investment costs for their own lost
intellectual efforts.
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What would stop Clyde or Bonnie from giving away their own
intellectual efforts or the efforts of the other player? Clyde or
Bonnie could post the noodle recipe or widget-making machine
designs on the Internet or any other public sharing site. In this case,
both players would lose investment and start-up costs, but neither
would be at a positional disadvantage.
Furthermore, rather than assuming that Bonnie and Clyde have
similar investment costs, imagine that the investment costs of
creating the noodle recipe is a fraction of the cost of creating the
widget-machine designs. In this case, other things being equal,
Bonnie would have an advantage.39 By selling widgets she would
be able to recoup the investment costs of developing the noodle
recipe before Clyde would be able to recoup the investment costs
of developing the machine by selling noodles. Once Bonnie has
recouped her costs and perhaps pocketed a nice profit, she could
simply give away her noodle recipe for free. If she does this, then
Clyde’s ability to sell noodles for a profit would vanish. Knowing
this, Clyde might consider posting online the designs of his widget
machine in order to undermine Bonnie’s ill-gotten widget market.
After copying and exploiting the intellectual efforts of each
other—Clyde taking and exploiting Bonnie’s noodle recipe and
Bonnie taking and exploiting Clyde’s widget-making machine
designs—they would both have to consider the further noncooperative act of publicizing these intellectual works, and thus
undermining the other’s income capacity.
An iterated version of this dilemma might run as follows:
Suppose Bonnie and Clyde each have numerous opportunities to
copy the intellectual works of the other. Both have lots of novel
machine designs or new recipes. Additionally, each knows that
they will face the question of copying and exploiting the other’s
work or refraining from copying and exploiting the other’s work.
The sub-optimal outcome is assured if both Bonnie and Clyde
decide to copy and exploit the intellectual creations of the other.
Both would quickly move on to other more profitable pursuits and
content creation would be minimized. This is analogous to the
39

In this scenario, it is assumed that both Bonnie and Clyde make approximately the
same monthly income by selling noodles or widgets, and that the other benefits and
expenditures are similar.
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“always defect or rat” mindset in iterated prisoner’s dilemmas.
Suppose, on the other hand, that both parties choose to cooperate,
opting not to copy or exploit the intellectual works of the other,
and to continue following this principle for as long as the other
player continues to cooperate. Both adopt a “tit-for-tat strategy.”40
If so, the sub-optimal result would be avoided and both Bonnie and
Clyde would be able to market their own intellectual efforts,
recoup investment costs, trade content with each other, and avoid
ending up in a disadvantaged position.
As soon as we look to an iterated game with multiple players,
which includes both content creators and mere content consumers,
it is highly unlikely that a tit-for-tat strategy would be adopted.41
First of all, content consumers would have no compelling reason to
adopt a tit-for-tat strategy because they have nothing to copy. If
enough users and creators copy, then content creation would be
suppressed and there would be much less content for everyone.
Everyone would suffer as a result. This sort of reasoning parallels
the considerations that occur in a tragedy of the commons
situation.42 The self-interested, prudent individual would seek to
overgraze his sheep, hoping that others will refrain. Others reason
similarly and the commons is ruined.
All of this might be stopped by adopting a robust principle of
transparency and accountability.43 Imagine that the identities of
those who overgrazed the commons were made public, and that
these individuals were shamed or ostracized. Reputations might
follow these non-cooperative individuals who chose to ruin the
commons for everyone in order to self-promote. Nevertheless,
there are two factors working against this analysis as it applies to
intellectual property. First, the copying of intellectual works is
easily done in secret. From reverse engineering artifacts to simply
copying files, no one has to know that my new “Ping” brand golf
40

See Axelrod, Emergence of Cooperation, supra note 10; Axelrod, EVOLUTION, supra
note 10.
41
It seems both Aristotle and Hume would agree. See generally ARISTOTLE,
ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press 1885) (c. 384–322
B.C.E.); HUME, supra note 5, at § 7; see also Bovens, supra note 19.
42
See generally Hardin, supra note 19.
43
See generally Gauthier, supra note 26.

848

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:831

driver is a knock-off copy or that the music streaming from my
phone was obtained illegally via BitTorrent.44
Second, copiers are not “frowned upon” or generally ashamed
of their actions. In fact, most believe that they are not harming
intellectual property creators or themselves when they copy.45
When accused of “theft,” copiers typically resort to one or all of
the following replies: (1) “But I didn’t take anything — they still
have their copy.” (2) “I wouldn’t have purchased the content
anyway, so ‘no harm, no foul.’” (3) “Ownership of intangible
works is misguided—ideas, language, even individuals, are social
products. We should not allow individuals to monopolize these
social products.” Elsewhere it has been argued that these replies
are not compelling, but there is no need to rehash these arguments
presently.46 At this point, all that should be noted is that
transparency and accountability as a means for avoiding the suboptimal outcome of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma won’t work.
If the argument presented above is correct, the dominant action
between two players in a single-play or iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game is to copy the content of the other. If copying and exploiting
the market is possible, then this behavior will dominate. Moreover,
in multi-player iterated prisoner’s dilemma games, copying or
copying coupled with market exploitation would be rationally
prudent. Additionally, copying for use or market exploitation
becomes ever more dominant when we consider content creators
and users in multi-player situations.
III. COPYING, INNOVATION, AND THE SUB-OPTIMAL OUTCOME
While it has been argued that copying or exploiting the
intellectual efforts of others will lead to a sub-optimal outcome in
terms of less innovation, this view needs to be more substantially
44

BitTorrent is software that allows peer-to-peer file sharing over the internet. About
BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, https://www.bittorrent.com/company/about [https://perma.cc
/NB3Z-Y4DJ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
45
See Adam D. Moore, Privacy, Intellectual Property, and Hacking: Evaluating Free
Access Arguments, in INTERNET SECURITY: HACKING, COUNTERHACKING, AND SOCIETY
235 (Ken Himma ed., Jones & Bartlett Pub. 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980857 [https://perma.cc/UT2C-XS7G].
46
See Moore, Lockean Theory Revisited, supra note 9.
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defended. If innovators would be motivated to create independent
of compensation and in spite of being able to recoup investment
costs, then copying would not lead to a suppression of content
creation and a sub-optimal outcome.
First, one could argue that there can be no tragedy of the
commons when considering intellectual property. Given that
intellectual property cannot be destroyed and can be concurrently
used by many individuals, there can be no ruin of the commons.
Upon closer examination, this assertion does not hold true. To
begin, ask, “What is the tragedy in the typical case?” Generally, it
is the destruction of some land or other object and the cause of the
destruction is scarcity and common access. But the tragedy cannot
actually be the destruction of land or some physical object because,
as we all well know, matter is neither created nor destroyed.47 The
tragedy is the loss of value, potential value, or opportunities.
Where there was once a green field capable of supporting life for
years to come, there is now a plot of mud, a barren wasteland, or a
polluted stream. If access to valuable resources is not restricted, the
tragedy will keep occurring.48
The tragedy in this, and other such cases, is not only the loss of
current value, but of future value. Unless access is restricted in
such a way that promotes the preservation or augmentation of
value, a tragedy will likely result.49 Now, suppose that intellectual
works were not protected—that if they “got out” anyone would be
able to profit from them. In such cases, individuals and companies
would seek to protect their intellectual efforts by keeping them a
secret. As noted below, secrecy was the predominant form of
protection used by guilds in the Middle Ages.50 The result of this
secrecy can be described as a tragedy or a loss of potential value. If
authors and inventors can be assured that their intellectual efforts
will be protected, then the information can be disseminated, and
47

See Henry Guerlac, Lavoisier Antione-Laurent, in 8 COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF
SCIENTIFIC BIOGRAPHY 66, 84 (8th ed. 2008).
48
A prime example is the Tongan coral reefs that have been being destroyed by
unsavory fishing practices. David Schmidtz, When is Original Acquisition Required?, 73
THE MONIST 504, 513 (1990). It seems that the best way to catch the most fish along the
reef is to pour bleach into the water, bringing the fish to the surface and choking the reef.
49
See Hardin, supra note 19, at 1243; Schmidtz, supra note 48, at 513.
50
See discussion infra Part III.
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licenses can be granted, so that others may build upon the
information and create new intellectual works. The tragedy of a
“no-protection rule” is secrecy, restricted markets, and lost
opportunities.51 This view is echoed by Professors Roger Meiners
and Robert Staaf:
The same story has been told about patents. If
inventions lost their exclusivity and became part of
the commons, then in the short run there would be
over-grazing. The inventor could not exclude
others, and products that embody previously
patentable ideas would now yield a lower rate of
return. There would be lower returns to the activity
of inventing, so that innovative minds would
become less innovative. In the case of open ranges,
common rights destroy what nature endows, and in
the long run keeps the land barren because no one
will invest to make the land fertile. Similarly,
common rights would make the intellectual field of
innovations less productive relative to a private
property right system.52
It should be obvious that such considerations would inevitably lead
content creators to deploy their efforts in less risky pursuits.53 If
would-be innovators know that they would likely end up playing
51

Not all secrecy is a bad thing. Surely, keeping sensitive personal information to
oneself is justified. For more about secrecy and the control of sensitive personal
information, see generally ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS (Univ. Park, Pennsylvania: Penn. State Univ. Press, 2010).
52
Roger Miners & Robert Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or
Monopoly, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 919 (1990).
53
William Fisher notes: “[P]otential innovators will know that, once they reveal their
breakthroughs to the world, other people will be able to take advantage of them for free.
Consequently, the innovators will be unable to recoup the costs of their innovations (the
costs of the education they underwent to prepare them to make the innovations, the outlay
for research and development, their opportunity costs, etc.). Aware of this risk, potential
innovators will devote their energies to other, more lucrative activities, and society at
large will suffer.” William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical,
Empirical, and Historical Perspectives, in 37 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, BELEIDSSTUDIES TECHNOLOGIE ECONOMIE 50 (2001);
see also David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RESEARCH POL’Y 285
(1986).
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out prisoner’s dilemma games with each other numerous times,
and with countless other players, each would pick a different
profession. The incentives to create intellectual property content
would be severely undermined.
Nevertheless, some have called for the elimination of patent
and copyright regimes in favor of other forms of protection,
because, it is argued that these institutions are unnecessary for
innovation and content creation.54 For example, Professors
Michele Boldrin and David Levine argued that a “first mover
advantage,” coupled with secrecy and add-on services, is sufficient
as an incentive for creation and discovery.55 Tom Palmer made a
similar argument seventeen years earlier, arguing that intellectual
works should be protected via technological fences and contracts,
along with bundling in other products and services.56 Richard
Stallman, focusing on software production, famously argued that
without copyright or patent protection, programmers would
continue to produce, “because it is fun!”57 In 1958 Fritz Machlup
wrote:
No economist, on the basis of present knowledge,
could possibly state with certainty that the patent
system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit or a
net loss upon society . . . . If one does not know
whether a system ‘as a whole’ (in contrast to certain
features of it) is good or bad, the safest ‘policy
54

See generally ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE
NETHERLANDS, 1869–1912; SWITZERLAND, 1850–1907 (Princeton Univ. Press 1971);
Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 31 (1989);
Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach,
12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 303 (1989) [hereinafter Palmer, Intellectual Property]; Tom G.
Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?: The Philosophy of Property
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (1990) [hereinafter Palmer,
Patents and Copyrights]; MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008); N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38 (Ludwig von Mises Inst., 2008).
55
See, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 54, at 142–47.
56
Palmer, Intellectual Property, supra note 54, at 288–89; Technological fencing
includes the use of encryption passwords and product registration while bundled services
would include receiving free software updates or free access to technical support experts.
57
Richard Stallman, Why Software Should Be Free, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM (1992),
reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS
272–85 (A. Moore ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1997).
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conclusion’ is to ‘muddle through’—either with it,
if one has lived long with it, or without it, if one has
lived without it. If we did not have a patent system,
it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to
recommend instituting one. But since we have had a
patent system for a long time, it would be
irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.58
If Machlup is correct, and contra to Boldrin, Levine, Palmer, and
Stallman, there may be good reasons to retain our intellectual
property institutions. Moreover, while it is admittedly difficult to
compare the innovative output of our current system of copyrights,
patents, global treaties, and competitive markets to other
arrangements or institutions we might use to promote content
creation, consider the following argument.
Imagine that you are a content creator and have the option of
residing in one of several different city-states. In the city of “No
Protection” there are no laws to protect the intellectual efforts of
those who create or discover new intellectual works. In this city,
protection is left to individual efforts like encryption or secrecy. In
No Protection anyone can copy and exploit the intellectual efforts
of anyone else. A short distance away is the city of “Guilds.” In
Guilds, secretive groups control innovation and uses of inventions
backed by the force of law. For example, the wool-making guild
has an ironclad and legally enforceable monopoly over the
production of wool, along with all wool-making technology. If a
citizen or visitor invents a better way to produce wool, then the
guild can seize the innovation and legally prohibit the innovator
from selling her invention or using it to produce wool.59 Finally,
there is a third city, called “IP Protection.” In this city, new and
original intellectual works are protected through the use of various
legal instruments like copyrights and patents.

58

SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT OF THE S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., STUD. NO. 15 ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 79–80 (Comm. Print 1958)
(prepared by Fritz Machlup) [hereinafter Machlup].
59
See, e.g., discussion infra Part III, p. 849–52.
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If your intellectual efforts include substantial research and
development costs, it seems that your best option is the city of IP
Protection. Short of working for free, or because you are already
financially advantaged, moving to No Protection or to Guilds
would likely leave you with no way to recover your costs.
Moreover, you may notice that numerous other innovators are also
taking up residence in IP Protection, leading to increased
innovation and healthy markets. Suppose that in response to free
riders attempting to copy and cash in on the efforts of innovators,
the city adopted anti-copying statutes where a violation is met with
ostracism or denied access to the city.60 Sound far-fetched?
Although there is a different story, this appears to be what
happened in the Venetian Republic of 1474.61
Proposed by committee, the general patent statute passed in the
Venetian Senate in 1474 by a vote of 116 to 10.62 The statute read
as follows:
We have among us men of great genius, apt to
invent and discover ingenious devices; and in view
of the grandeur and virtue of our City, more such
men come to us every day from divers parts. Now,
if provision were made for the works and devices
discovered by such persons, so that others, who may
see them could not build them and take the
inventor’s honor away, more men would then apply
their genius, would discover, and would build
devices of great utility and benefit to our
commonwealth . . . Therefore: Be it enacted that,
by the authority of this Council, every person who
shall build any new and ingenious device in this
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth,
shall give notice of it to the office of our General
60

See Holt et al., supra note 22, at 246. See also A. Gunnthorsdittir, D. Houser, & K.
McCabe, Disposition, History and Contributions in Public Goods Experiments, 62 J.
ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 304, 304, 310 (2007) (providing evidence of the synergistic
effects of cooperators being grouped together).
61
See generally BRUCE BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW
(Pub. Aff. Press 1967).
62
G. Mandich, Venetian Inventors’ Rights, reprinted in B. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF
AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 22 (1967).
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Welfare Board when it has been reduced to
perfection so that it can be used and operated. It
being forbidden to every other person in any of our
territories and towns to make any further device
conforming with and similar to said one, without
the consent and license of the author, for a term of
10 years. And if anybody builds it in violation
hereof, the aforesaid author and inventor shall be
entitled to have him summoned before any
magistrate of this City, by which magistrate the said
infringer shall be constrained to pay him hundred
ducats; and the devise shall be destroyed at once.63
This statute appeared 150 years before England’s Statute of
Monopolies64 and provided the foundation for the world’s first,
lasting institution of intellectual property protection.65 Moreover,
the system was remarkably mature and sophisticated. The rights of
inventors were recognized, an incentive mechanism was included,
compensation for infringement was established, and a term limit on
inventor’s rights was imposed.66
Perhaps as a method to attract skilled individuals and to
undermine the power of the guilds, the Venetian Republic began
with rather limited legislation.67 Originally, those who invented
better technology or made improvements on existing technology
simply had their efforts seized by the guilds.68 After bitter
complaining from both citizens and non-citizens alike, the
Venetian Republic enacted a law that allowed individuals who
innovated to seek permission to compete from the appropriate
63

Id.
English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jam. 1, c. 3.
65
See generally Bugbee, supra note 61.
66
Id.
67
For a concise analysis of the Venetian Republic’s laws protecting intellectual
property, see Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition:
The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267,
1267–81 (2012).
68
“In France, the persecution of innovators by guilds of craftsmen continued far into
the 18th century . . . for example, in 1726, the weavers guild threatened design printers
with severe punishment, including death.” Machlup, supra note 58, at 2.
64
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guild.69 In this case, if granted permission, the inventor could
operate within the city and compete with the guild.70 It is hardly
surprising that the guilds were obstructionist when these requests
occurred, so after further complaining, the Venetian Republic
allowed innovators to compete with the guilds without guild
permission.71 However, this new law was criticized by inventors
because it allowed the guilds to still take and use the innovations of
non-guild members.72 Given the widespread guild influence within
city markets, it was rather easy for the guilds to use the efforts of
the outside creators and secure a dominant market share.73 Thus,
finally in 1474 the Venetian Republic included exclusionary rights
where those who invented new and original intellectual works
could prohibit all others from using or profiting from these works
for a period of time.74 Moreover, not only did the Venetian
Republic and the patent statute of 1474 begin to break up the
power and control of the guilds, but it also acted as a magnet for
foreign artisans and as a model for other city-states.75
In an interesting article comparing different intellectual
property systems across different countries rather than city-states,
Petra Moser makes the following observation:
In countries without patent laws, inventors depend
entirely on secrecy, lead-time, and other alternatives
to patents in protecting their intellectual property.
As a result, investments in research and
development may be most attractive in industries in
which secrecy can effectively guarantee exclusive
rights long enough to allow inventors to recoup
their investments. In countries with patent laws,
inventors can use legal protection to establish
exclusivity in any industry, so factors other than the

69

See generally Machlup, supra note 58, at 2; Bugbee, supra note 61, at 22; Sichelman
& O’Connor, supra note 67, at 1272–73.
70
Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 67, at 1272–73.
71
Id. at 1274.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1269.
74
Machlup, supra note 58, at 2; Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 67, at 1275.
75
Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 67, at 1279.
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effectiveness of secrecy determine the direction of
technical change.76
This helps to explain why patents are under-utilized in different
technology sectors. For example, in the early 1980s research and
development executives in the industries of electrical equipment,
primary metals, rubber, and textiles, claimed that “patent
protection was not essential for the development or introduction of
any of their inventions.”77 Even so, most of the innovations were
patented anyway due to the perceived benefits compared to the
patent costs.78 Moreover, and more importantly, the ability to
protect innovations through the use of trade secrets seemed to be
the guiding principle for those inventions not covered by patent
protection.79
Citing literature focusing on innovation within the
pharmaceutical industry, William Fisher notes, “60% of the
pharmaceutical inventions made between 1981 and 1983 would not
have been developed at all and 65% of those inventions would not
have been introduced into commerce if patent protection had been
unavailable.”80 Within the chemical industry, 30% of the
innovations would not have occurred without patents.81 In
“petroleum, machinery, and fabricated metal products, patent
protection was estimated to be essential for the development and
introduction of about 10-20 percent of . . . innovation.”82 Again, if
not for patents and secrecy, supported via a regime of trade secrets,
society seemingly gets less innovation.
76

Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History, 27 J. OF
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 23, 30 (2013) (emphasis in original); see also David Kline, Do
Patents Truly Promote Innovation? IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/04/15/do-patents-truly-promote-innovation/id=48768/
[https://perma.cc/PB9Z-DMTU].
77
Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 174
(1986).
78
See id. at 176.
79
For an argument that trade secret protections are property claims, see Eric Claeys,
Intellectual Usufructs: Trade Secrets, Hot News, and the Usufructuary Paradigm at
Common Law, in INTELL. PROP. AND THE COMMON LAW 404 (Shyam Balganesh ed.,
2015).
80
Fisher, supra note 53, at 10.
81
Id.
82
Mansfield, supra note 77, at 174.
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If the number of issued patents is used as a proxy for
innovation, the United States, along with several other countries,
has a distinct advantage.83 Others have noted that the United States
spent over $400 billion in research and development in 2011, more
than double that of its closest competitor China: “U.S. based
inventors received nearly 2 ½ times the number of U.S. patents
compared” to its nearest rival.84 Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-IMartin note that, over the long run, the world’s growth rate is
largely
driven by discoveries in the technologically leading
economies. Followers converge at least part way
toward the leaders because copying is cheaper than
innovation over some range. As the pool of
uncopied ideas diminishes, the cost of imitation
tends to increase . . . the consequence from the
absence of intellectual property rights across
economies . . . [is] the leading places tend to have
insufficient incentive to invent, and the follower
places tend to have excessive incentive to copy.85
These empirical findings support the earlier contention that in
single-play or iterated, multi-player, prisoner’s dilemma games, the
dominant strategy would be to copy the intellectual efforts of
others
and
avoid
upfront
investment
costs.86
83

William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341 (2013).
Christopher B. Seaman, American Innovation and the Limits of Patent Law: A
Response to William Hubbard, 23 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 24 (2013) (internal citations
omitted).
85
Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Technological Diffusion, Convergence, and
Growth, 2 J. ECON. GROWTH 1, 23 (1997) (emphasis added); “Whether through wisdom,
ideology, or good fortune, the framers of the U.S. patent system fashioned a structure that
has had a powerful impact on the patterns of inventive activity and generally worked
well. According to Abraham Lincoln—himself a patentee—the system ‘added the fuel of
interest to the fire of genius.’ Its attention to the provision of broad access to, and strict
enforcement of, property rights in new inventions, coupled with the requirement of public
disclosure, was extremely effective at stimulating the growth of a market for technology
and promoting technical change.” Kenneth L. Sokoloff & B. Zorina Khan, Intellectual
Property Institutions in the United States: Early Development and Comparative
Perspective, 9, presented at World Bank Summer Research Workshop on Market
Institutions (July 17–19, 2000), http://www.dklevine.com/archive/sokoloff-kahn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5L4-XZ6H].
86
See supra Part II.
84
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While much of the economic literature in this area focuses on
patents, similar points can be made with respect to copyright. With
the ease of copying and distribution afforded by modern digital
networks, content creators would seem to be at a serious
disadvantage compared to copiers. Without copyright there would
be nothing to stop copiers from simply copying movies, books,
articles, and music and selling, trading, or allowing others to make
free copies.87 Prior to international copyright treaties, like the
Berne Convention or Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property, this was exactly what happened.88
Consider the costs hidden in the creation of a song or CD.
From music lessons to recording software, demo tapes, numerous
hours practicing and honing musical skills, not to mention eating
and paying the electricity bill, there are lots of costs hidden in a
song, album, or CD. A “professional album,” Mathew Barblan
writes, includes “costs for the studio, recording engineer, producer,
studio musicians, back-up singers, mixing, and mastering, can push
the price tag into the hundreds of thousands of dollars.”89
87
Michael Smith, Brett Danaher, and Rahaul Telang note that “in the 10 years
following Napster’s introduction in 1999, global recorded music sales decreased 50% . . .
DVD/VHS sales . . . fell 27% in the four years after the widespread adoption of the
BitTorrent protocol in 2004.” Brett Danaher, Michael D. Smith, & Rahul Telang,
Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications,
60 COMM. OF THE ACM 68 (2017). Michael Smith and Rahul Telang also note “that
traffic from the popular file-sharing protocol BitTorrent accounted for [thirty-one]
percent of all North American Internet traffic during peak-traffic periods in 2008.”
MICHAEL SMITH & RAHUL TELANG, STREAMING, SHARING, AND STEALING: BIG DATA THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 9 (2016) [hereinafter, STREAMING, SHARING, AND STEALING].
88
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for
signature Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) (revised at
Paris, July 24, 1971, amended in 1979) [hereinafter Berne]; Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (entered into
force for the United States Mar. 1, 1989) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)); Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); TRIPS:
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994;
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 1–19, at 365–403 (Gatt
Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. See sources supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
89
Matthew Barblan, Copyright as a Platform for Artistic and Creative Freedom, 23
GEO. MASON L. REV. 795 (2016).
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Production and distribution costs are even more profound when
considering movies or plays.90 Sean O’Connor notes, “it should be
clear that no one would invest without some appropriation
mechanism that would provide them with a favorable return on
their investment through the monetization of the commercialized
goods or services. If they cannot see a way to get such a return,
they will not make the investment.”91 Simply put, with millions in
production and distribution costs at stake, movies or other sorts of
content would not be made without some sort of process where
creators could recoup these costs.92 These claims are further
supported by the recent work of Michael Smith and Rahul Telang,
who argue that piracy harms both producers and consumers by
undermining the income streams of producers, resulting in less
content being created and consumed.93

90

For some of the benefits and limitations of “the world’s greatest naturally occurring
experiment in cultural production without copyright: the burgeoning audiovisual industry
of Nigeria, aka “Nollywood,” see Justin Hughes, Motion Pictures, Markets, and
Copylocks, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941 (2016).
91
Sean M. O’Connor, Creators, Innovators, and Appropriation Mechanisms, 22 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 973, 982 (2015).
92
Adam Mossoff has argued that even in the area of scholarly production of research,
an area where economic incentives don’t seem to apply, that “copyright incentivizes the
business models necessary for converting a new scientific discovery or technical
invention into a standardized and high-quality article that communicates this information
to other scholars and researchers.” Adam Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation: A
Case Study of Scholarly Publishing in the Digital World, 3 MICH. ST. L. REV. 955 (2016).
93
See, STREAMING, SHARING, AND STEALING, supra note 87. “Using data from all wide
release movies in the US from 2006 to 2008 we predict that if piracy could be eliminated
from the theatrical window then box-office revenues would increase by 16% or $1.3b per
year.” Liye Ma, Alan L. Montgomery, & Michael D. Smith, The Dual Impact of Movie
Piracy on Box-Office Revenue: Cannibalization and Promotion, J. MKT. RES. 1, 2 (2016),
https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/alm3/papers/movie%20piracy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L6ZA-586N]. Movie piracy is also implicated in the economic
downturn confronting independent movie producers and art-house labels. Without the
ability to tie movie revenues to t-shirts, action figures, and theme parks, and thus recoup
losses from piracy, independent movie producers are struggling. “If piracy continues to
be rampant like this, then in four to five years it will be the end of the independent film
business as we know it . . . .” Nelson Granados, How Piracy Is Still Hurting the
Filmmakers and Artists You Admire, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2015, 12:08 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nelsongranados/2015/12/03/how-piracy-hurts-thefilmmakers-and-artists-you-admire/#26bc9f234554
[https://perma.cc/PC7F-R3BY]
(internal citations omitted).
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Finally, I am well aware that the evidence offered in this
section is not conclusive. At best, all that has been demonstrated is
that the institutions of patent, copyright, and trade secret protection
likely provide incentives to innovate. Societies that adopt these
practices tend to do better in terms of overall well-being compared
to societies that do not. In any case, conclusive support for the
claim that patent, copyright, and trade secret are optimal in terms
of producing overall well-being is not necessary for the argument
under consideration. If it is likely that copying leads to a suboptimal result and that not copying yields a collectively superior
result, then all that is needed is some form of sanction or process
that pushes would-be copiers in the optimal direction.

IV. COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADE SECRETS AS PATHS
TOWARD COLLECTIVE OPTIMALITY
“But why copyrights, patents, and trade secrets?” you might
ask. If the position under consideration holds, some form of
protection is needed—some way to make it in everyone’s best
interest to not copy. Institutions of copyright, patent, and trade
secret are not necessary for this purpose, although they may be
sufficient.94 By changing the payoffs of the intellectual property
prisoner’s dilemma through the use of copyrights, patents, and
trade secrets, a path toward collective optimality will have been
opened.
Within the Anglo-American tradition, intellectual property is
protected by the legal regimes of copyright, patent, and trade
secret.95 Copyright protection extends to original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.96 Works
94
Other protection “tweaks” could also be implemented. For example, legal
obligations to remove pirate sites from search engine results have been shown to be an
effective strategy. See Smith & Telang, supra note 87, at 96.
95
Trademark and the law of ideas, two areas of law with significant overlap into the
realm of intellectual property, will not be discussed.
96
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The three major restrictions on the bundle of rights that
surround copyright are (1) fair use, under 17 U.S.C. § 107 and per District Judge Leval’s
opinion in New Era Publications Intern. v. Henry Holt and Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); (2) limited duration (17 U.S.C. § 302); and (3) the first sale rule under
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that may be copyrighted include books, songs, photographs,
movies, maps, architectural designs and computer software.97
There are five exclusive rights that copyright owners enjoy and
three major restrictions on these rights. The five rights are the right
to reproduce the work, to adapt it or derive other works from it, to
distribute copies of the work, to display the work publicly, and to
perform it publicly.98 Each of these rights may be parsed out and
sold separately.99 All five rights lapse after the lifetime of the
author plus 70 years;100 and in the case of works for hire, the term
is set at 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever comes first.101
The domain or subject matter of patent protection is the
invention and discovery of new and useful processes, machines,
articles of manufacture, or compositions of matter.102 Patents yield
the strongest form of protection, in that a twenty-year exclusive
monopoly is granted over any expression or implementation of the
protected work.103 The bundle of rights conferred on a patent
owner includes the right to make, the right to use, the right to sell,

17 U.S.C. § 109(a). The first sale rule prevents a copyright holder who has sold copies of
the protected work from later interfering with the subsequent sale of those copies. It
should also be noted that copyright protection does not exclude independent original
creation—for example, if an author independently creates a work that is substantially
similar to a copyrighted expression then, he can obtain copyright protection. See 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
97
Copyright code was amended in 1988 to include computer software. See 17 U.S.C. §
102 (1988).
98
17 U.S.C. § 106.
99
See id.
100
See 17 U.S.C.§ 302.
101
See id. The Constitution requires limited terms for copyright and patent protections.
The Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). The
other two restrictions are “fair use” and “first sale.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–08.
102
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984 & Supp. 1989). Patents may be granted when the subject
matter satisfies the criteria of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. See 35 U.S.C. §§
101–07. Unlike copyright, patent law protects the totality of the idea, expression, and
implementation. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–07.
103
The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The 1995 version of the Patent Act has
added three years to the term of patent protection—from seventeen to twenty. See 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
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and the right to authorize others to sell the patented item.104
Moreover, the bundle of rights conferred by a patent excludes
others from making, using, or selling the invention, regardless of
independent creation.105
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information that is used in one’s business.106 Trade
secrecy laws rely entirely on private measures, rather than state
action, to maintain exclusivity.107 Furthermore, the subject matter
of a trade secret is almost unlimited in terms of the content of the
information that is subject to protection.108 Within the secrecy
requirement, owners of trade secrets enjoy management rights and
are protected from misappropriation.109
Given the argument so far, there is nothing that necessitates
copyrights that last the author’s lifetime plus seventy years, or
patents that last twenty years. All that is needed to avoid suboptimal results is a sanction that changes the payoffs of the
prisoner’s dilemma, making cooperation or not copying, the
prudent act. The modern institutions of patent, copyright, and trade
secret perform this function. Moreover, these institutions are
already in place.
Again, consider Crusoe and Friday playing a prisoner’s
dilemma game where they are each considering if copying and
violating the other’s copyright is the best option. Both may well
take heed to consider that the willful infringement of a copyright
can result in a $150,000 penalty and up to five years in jail. In this
new game, with copyright sanctions in place, the best option is to
not copy.
104

See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
See id.
106
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (Am. Law
Inst. 1995) (containing the most current information about the law of trade secrets). The
two major restrictions on the domain of trade secrets are the requirements of secrecy and
competitive advantage. Although trade secret rights have no built-in sunset, they are
extremely limited in one important respect; owners of trade secrets have exclusive rights
to make use of the secret but only as long as the secret is maintained. If the secret is made
public by the owner, then the trade secret protection lapses and anyone can make use of
it. Moreover, the rights of the owner do not exclude independent invention or discovery.
107
Id. at comment g.
108
Id. at comment d.
109
Id. at comment f.
105
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Figure 3:

Similarly, for patent infringement, the plaintiffs can be
awarded an injunction against further use and “damages adequate
to compensate” for the unauthorized use.110 Along with an
injunction against the use of the misappropriated information,
owners of trade secrets may be entitled to compensatory damages,
lost royalties, and punitive damages.111 With copyright, patent, and
trade secret institutions in place, along with appropriate
enforcement mechanisms, we have changed the payoffs of iterated,
multi-player, intellectual property, prisoner’s dilemma games. Not
copying becomes the dominant strategy.
Note, there is nothing in the argument offered so far that would
prohibit copyrights that last for fifteen years or patents that last
five years.112 We could eliminate exclusive patent monopolies and
allow those who independently innovate to obtain protection along
with current patent holders.113 Fair use could be weakened or
strengthened, as with forced patent licensing. So long as incentives
to innovate are maintained, which include enforced sanctions
110

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–289 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 44–45 (Am. Law Inst.
1995).
112
For arguments regarding the optimal length of patent protection, see WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (MIT Press 1969). For arguments regarding the optimal length
of copyright protection, see Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous
Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, And Network Effects,
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435 (2005).
113
For an argument to abandon exclusive patent monopolies, see Moore, Lockean
Theory, supra note 9, at 74.
111
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against copying, we will have provided ourselves reasons to avoid
what narrow self-interest and prudence would otherwise dictate.
Rather than focusing on content creation, imitation, and
copying within a country, it is possible to look more broadly and
consider if a prisoner’s dilemma arises between states or citizens of
different countries.114 Peter Andreas writes:
In its adolescent years, the [United States] was a
hotbed of intellectual piracy and technology
smuggling, particularly in the textile industry,
acquiring both machines and skilled machinists in
violation of British export and emigration laws.
Only after it had become a mature industrial power
did the country vigorously campaign for
intellectual-property protection.115
Andreas notes further that Alexander Hamilton, in his 1791
“Report on Manufactures” to the House of Representatives, argued
for the wholesale theft of technology from Europe.116 Moreover,
the first U.S. Patent Act of 1790 allowed for the theft of foreign
intellectual property and subsequent protection within the United
States.117
An interesting case study of an intellectual property prisoner’s
dilemma between countries is found in Eric Schiff’s book,
Industrialization Without National Patents.118 Schiff, and those
who cite him, fail to see that the success of the Netherlands and
Switzerland in maintaining or advancing industrialization in the
late 1800s/early 1900s was parasitic on the intellectual property
institutions of other countries. For example, an innovator in the
Netherlands circa 1885 could not patent his intellectual work
domestically, but because of membership in the International
114

See generally Bugbee, supra note 61.
Peter Andreas, Piracy and Fraud Propelled the U.S. Industrial Revolution,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2013, 11:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/201302-01/piracy-and-fraud-propelled-the-u-s-industrial-revolution [https://perma.cc/F9D9Q9DC].
116
Alexander Hamilton, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (presented to the House of
Representatives, Dec. 5, 1791), http://constitution.org/ah/rpt_manufactures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CPF-3SK4].
117
See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790).
118
SCHIFF, supra note 54, at 513. See also Boldrin & Levine, supra note 54, at 7.
115
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Union, he could patent his work in France, Germany, and the
United States, thus securing income from his efforts.119 Schiff
notes, “one of the basic principles of the International Union
was . . . that with respect to protection of industrial property every
member country should treat the citizens or residents of any other
country just as it treats its own nationals, even if the latter enjoy
less protection or none at all in the foreign country.”120 Moreover,
given that there was no patent system in the Netherlands and
Switzerland, innovations from outside these countries were able to
be imported and operationalized without sanctions.121 Patent
institutions generally require disclosure,122 which made it
exceedingly easy to copy and exploit the efforts of others in
countries without patent institutions. In the optimal case, citizens
and corporations in foreign countries with patent institutions must
comply with your patent rights, while domestically—where your
business resides—you can safely ignore their patent claims.
In response to this sort of activity, at the 1887 meetings of the
International Union, the United States proposed that “any
invention that is not patentable in the country of origin, may be
excluded from protection in any other member country that finds it
expedient to exclude it.”123 More telling language was used by W.
Stuber, a German national, who referenced the Swiss people as
“robber barons” and “parasites.”124 Foreshowing the TRIPS
agreement discussed below, in response to the Swiss theft of
German intellectual efforts, in 1907 Germany threatened tariffs on
various Swiss products.125 By 1910, both the Netherlands and
Switzerland had adopted patent institutions.126

119

See generally Boldrin & Levine, supra note 54.
Schiff, supra note 54, at 89.
121
Id. at 69–101.
122
See generally Corinne Langinier & GianCarlo Moschini, The Economics of Patents:
An Overview (Ctr. for Agric. and Rural Dev., Working Paper No. 02-WP 293, 2002),
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/18374/1/wp020293.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT2CYHSM].
123
SCHIFF, supra note 54, at 93 (citing F. Meili, Die Prinzipien des Schweizerichen
Patentgesetzes 11 (1890)).
124
Id. at 94 (citing W. Stuber, Die Patentierbarkeit Chemischer Erfindungen (1907)).
125
Machlup supra note 58, at 5.
126
Id.
120
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Similar problems with copyright also occurred in the United
States. Traveling in the United States in 1842 Charles Dickens
wrote:
Is it not a horrible thing that scoundrel booksellers
should grow rich here from publishing books, the
authors of which do not reap one farthing from their
issue by scores of thousands; . . . Is it tolerable that
besides being robbed and rifled an author should be
forced to appear in any form, in any vulgar dress, in
any atrocious company; that he should have no
choice of his audience, no control over his own
distorted text, and that he should be compelled to
jostle out of the course the best men in this country
who only ask to live by writing? I vow before high
heaven that my blood so boils at these enormities,
that when I speak about them I seem to grow twenty
feet high, and to swell out in proportion. ‘Robbers
that ye are.’127
Dickens was railing against the practice of bribing English
publishers, obtaining advance copies of books, and then selling
these copies throughout the United States without compensating
the authors.128 With no international copyright protections, there
was little Dickens or other writers could do about these practices.
Moreover, given that U.S. authors were not as yet producing at the
same rate as their English counterparts,129 U.S. publishers had little
to lose and lots to gain by participating in this practice.
After Dickens was joined by Mark Twain and others, the U.S.
reversed course in 1891 by enacting the Chace Act.130 “The
absence of international copyright laws allowed Canadian
publishers to prey on Mark Twain’s early books. He was hurt
badly in 1876, when the Toronto publisher Charles Belford issued
127

CHARLES DICKENS, THE SELECTED LETTERS OF CHARLES DICKENS, 230 (Jenny
Hartley ed., 2012).
128
Id.
129
See PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANSATLANTIC
BATTLE 113 (2014).
130
International Copyright Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106; see Thorvald Solberg, The
International Copyright Union, 91 ADVOCATE OF PEACE THROUGH JUSTICE 98 (1929).
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Tom Sawyer before the American edition even appeared.”131 Twain
also noted a second kind of harm visited upon authors unprotected
by international copyrights. Domestic publishing houses would
earn higher profits by publishing unauthorized copies of foreign
authors because there were no royalty costs.132 This practice had
the effect of suppressing innovative activity within the U.S.
Nevertheless, as innovation increased in the United States, Canada,
Australia, and other markets, and as reverse theft, industrial
espionage, and unauthorized copying occurred, these countries
found it in their interest to join together and enact international
intellectual property legislation.133 Given that there was no
authority by which one country could force another to adopt
international copyright and patent protection, content creating
countries simply had to wait until emerging counties developed
their own markets of innovation.134
This was not the case for what is now known as the TRIPS
agreement of 1994.135 The TRIPS “regime provides mechanisms
for both the United States and the European Union to enforce
provisions that increase protection in newly industrialized and
developing nations.”136 Simply put, if a developing nation wanted
access to U.S. or E.U. markets, then they have to agree to
international protections for intellectual property.137 While
131

Philip V. Allingham, Nineteenth-Century British and American Copyright Law, THE
VICTORIAN WEB (Jan. 5, 2001), http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/dickens/pva
/pva74.html [https://perma.cc/FEJ5-AFM2] (quoting R. RASMUSEN & R. KENT, MARK
TWAIN A TO Z: THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE TO HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS 54 (1995))
132
Philip V. Allingham, Nineteenth-Century British and American Copyright Law, THE
VICTORIAN WEB (Jan. 5, 2001), http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/dickens/pva
/pva74.html [https://perma.cc/CJ32-LTZ4].
133
See John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No Copyright: Registration, Cultural
Hierarchy, and the Myth of American Copyright Militancy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1399, 1406 (2009); Hal Varian, Copying and Copyright, 19 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES
121, 121–38 (2005); David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation, Harmonization: An
International Copyright Proposal for the United States, 55 LAW & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 211 (1992).
134
See generally Tehranian, supra note 133.
135
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 88.
136
Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 447 (2013); see also, Marci Hamilton, The TRIPS
Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613
(1996).
137
Hamilton, supra note 136, at 617.
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developing nations might have comparatively little innovative
activity to protect in signing the TRIPS agreement, they have a lot
to lose by being restricted from U.S. and E.U. markets. Obviously,
these sanctions change the payoffs of the prisoner’s dilemma game
and allow a way out without waiting for countries to develop their
own innovative industries.138
CONCLUSION
In this Article, and setting aside various foundational moral
entanglements, an argument has been offered for the protection of
intellectual property based on individual self-interest and prudence.
If copying becomes too widespread, or if enforcement mechanisms
fail, then we will inevitably spiral toward the collectively suboptimal result of suppressing innovation and content creation.
Through the use of sanctions against copying the intellectual
efforts of others, we give ourselves compelling reasons to pursue a
collectively superior outcome.
We could dismantle copyright, patent, and trade secrete
institutions and build some different set of legal or societal
instruments to deter copying and incentivize innovation. Arguably,
such efforts would be politically and economically impractical. It
is as if we have sectioned off Hardin’s commons with assigned
property rights and protective legal instruments, find that this
system works, and are now considering whether replacing these
institutions with some other arrangement would allow us to avoid
the tragedy of the commons in some better way. There may be a
better way, but the costs of such a shift would be massive and
taking such a gamble would be rather imprudent.139
138

Admittedly, many find the TRIPS “agreement” rather hollow, claiming that it is
based on bullying by the United States and EU. China was not considered for WTO or
TRIPS membership until several years after the initial agreement. See Natalie P.
Stoianoff, The Influence of the WTO over China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 34
SIDNEY L. REV. 65–89 (2012); Robert M. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual
Property System Makes Sense for the World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds.,
1993).
139
See generally Machlup supra note 58; Moore, Incentive Based Arguments, supra
note 2.
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Alternatively, we could modify our current institutions,
tweaking things here and there to optimize access and incentives to
create.140 So long as we give ourselves compelling reasons to
refrain from narrowly prudent and self-interested copying or
imitation, we can avoid the sub-optimal results and aim at
collectively rational payoffs. We already have institutions in place
that allow us to avoid a tragedy of the commons related to
intellectual property.
What is objectionable with the copying and pirating of
computer software, music, machine designs, and other forms of
intellectual property is that, in most cases, we are acting on an
impulse that likely thwarts our own wider interests. “I want
freedom over time in jail. I want more content, leisure time, health,
software, and entertainment. No one is harmed by my taking.” I
dare say that only those who are not employed as content creators,
or those inventors funded in some other way, typically make such
claims. Even more cynically, many who hold such views attempt
to undermine the protections for other content creators and
innovators, while at the same time using government to secure
their own intellectual property rights. Everyone has prudential and
self-interest based reasons to avoid content piracy or illegitimate
copying. “Copying the creations of others because I can” may feel
good in the moment, but once understood as a prisoner’s dilemma,
where such behavior yields all of us sub-optimal results, we can
more easily support—imperfect as they are—the institutions of
copyright, patent, and trade secret.
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